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While this attack string results in an error in Oracle and other database servers that do not allow the batch-execution of statements separated by semicolons, in databases that do allow batch execution, this type of attack allows the attacker to execute arbitrary commands against the database. Many database servers, including Microsoft® SQL Server 2000, allow multiple SQL statements separated by semicolons to be executed at once. This flaw depends on the fact that SQL makes no real distinction between the control and data planes. #KASPERSKY PASSWORD MANAGER FLAW GENERATED EASILY SOFTWARE#The flaw is easily detected, and easily exploited, and as such, any site or software package with even a minimal user base is likely to be subject to an attempted attack of this kind.Įssentially, the attack is accomplished by placing a meta character into data input to then place SQL commands in the control plane, which did not exist there before. SQL Injection has become a common issue with database-driven web sites. * Platform: Any (requires interaction with a SQL database) * Integrity: Just as it may be possible to read sensitive information, it is also possible to make changes or even delete this information with a SQL Injection attack.įor a short video clip describing the vulnerability, click here (Courtesy of Checkmarx) Risk Factors * Authorization: If authorization information is held in a SQL database, it may be possible to change this information through the successful exploitation of a SQL Injection vulnerability. * Authentication: If poor SQL commands are used to check user names and passwords, it may be possible to connect to a system as another user with no previous knowledge of the password. * Confidentiality: Since SQL databases generally hold sensitive data, loss of confidentiality is a frequent problem with SQL Injection vulnerabilities. The data used to dynamically construct a SQL query Data enters a program from an untrusted source.Ģ. In general, consider SQL Injection a high impact severity. * The severity of SQL Injection attacks is limited by the attacker’s skill and imagination, and to a lesser extent, defense in depth countermeasures, such as low privilege connections to the database server and so on. Due to the nature of programmatic interfaces available, J2EE and ASP.NET applications are less likely to have easily exploited SQL injections. * SQL Injection is very common with PHP and ASP applications due to the prevalence of older functional interfaces. Threat Modeling * SQL injection attacks allow attackers to spoof identity, tamper with existing data, cause repudiation issues such as voiding transactions or changing balances, allow the complete disclosure of all data on the system, destroy the data or make it otherwise unavailable, and become administrators of the database server. SQL injection attacks are a type of injection attack, in which SQL commands are injected into data-plane input in order to effect the execution of predefined SQL commands. A successful SQL injection exploit can read sensitive data from the database, modify database data (Insert/Update/Delete), execute administration operations on the database (such as shutdown the DBMS), recover the content of a given file present on the DBMS file system and in some cases issue commands to the operating system. #KASPERSKY PASSWORD MANAGER FLAW GENERATED EASILY PASSWORD#The attacker may learn the time where the victim’s account was created, guess the timestamp in seconds, apply the Kaspersky algorithm and get the password right in four or five attempts if they’re lucky.SQL Injection And Counter Measure's OverviewA SQL injection attack consists of insertion or "injection" of a SQL query via the input data from the client to the application. Even if logon attempts are limited and the database never leaks, the password is still at risk. In other words, if a database of Kaspersky-generated passwords is ever leaked, consider them easily brute-forced, no matter what. So hashing isn’t going to help much here as well. But not if the space of possible passwords is as tiny as in the Kaspersky case. #KASPERSKY PASSWORD MANAGER FLAW GENERATED EASILY OFFLINE#Hashing passwords, if done properly, will buy you some time against an offline brute-forcer. So you can assume that the decryption key is going to ship along with the leak. That’s because if a service keeps passwords encrypted at rest, decryption keys may be available to the system at runtime. Encryption is irrelevant when your threat model involves a leaked user database. (You can tell how rampant the problem is: use unique email addresses per service, wait a year or two, and check how much spam you get on those addresses.) It happens all the time, even though many businesses don’t admit it. For internet-facing systems, your threat model should acknowledge that the user database is going to leak. ![]()
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